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Muehlenbeck, Philip E. Betting on the Africans: John F. 
Kennedy’s Courting of African Nationalist Leaders. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012, xxi + 333 pp.
In Betting on the Africans, Muehlenbeck focuses on President John F. Kennedy’s 
relationships with a number of prominent African leaders to analyze his efforts to 
improve US-Africa relations during his presidency (January 20, 1961 - November 
22, 1963). From the outset, Muehlenbeck contrasts “Kennedy’s policies of courting 
Third World nationalism” to the subsequent abandonment of these efforts in a larger 
shift towards an agenda focused on “Cold War concerns of anticommunism” that 
dominated other administrations (xiv). This is significant because, as Muehlenberg 
asserts, the shift away from Kennedy’s policies and ideologies relating to Africa 
and the developing world facilitated a considerable growth in anti- Americanism 
in subsequent presidencies (xiv).
Muehlenbeck carefully navigates the historiography of mid-twentieth 
century US-Africa relations by squarely situating this work as an effort to balance 
“modernization theory with personal diplomacy” (xv). As a result, Muehlenbeck 
seeks to consider Kennedy as a deeply strategic, yet highly personable figure in 
the construction of bonds between the US and Africa. Perhaps most importantly, 
Muehlenbeck perceives decolonization as “the most important historical force 
of the twentieth century,” thus, in gaining African leaders as allies, Kennedy had 
the ability to gain great respect from Africans while strengthening foreign policy 
(xvi). Ultimately, it is Muehlenbeck’s approach to Kennedy’s efforts in US-Africa 
relations through personal diplomacy that is very striking because it emphasizes a 
very different kind of diplomatic history that is underrepresented, especially within 
the histories of Africa, the Cold War, and US relations with Africa and Africans.
While the book could have easily devolved into a series of disconnected 
case studies in Cold War history, Muehlenbeck carefully crafts a framework for 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of JFK’s personal diplomacy by first 
beginning with a discussion of foreign policy under Eisenhower. Muehlenbeck 
then shifts to the Kennedy administration and his approach to African nationalism 
and US policy. After this somewhat prolonged introduction, Muehlenbeck delves 
into Kennedy’s relationships with individual African leaders like Sékou Touré 
of Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria. After 
examining these spaces, Muehlenbeck transitions to a discussion that focuses on 
the impact of Kennedy’s policies towards Africa and African nationalists, and how 
these exchanges bled into other areas of domestic and foreign policy. For example, 
Muehlenbeck gives considerable attention to the precarious nature of Kennedy’s 
stance towards minority rule in South Africa.
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While Muehlenbeck attempts to center his dialogue on personal diplomacy, 
there are critical issues with this approach. For example, Muehlenbeck makes 
great effort to emphasize Kennedy’s early support for African nationalism, 
especially during his years in Congress and the 1960 presidential campaign. Yet, 
he essentially explains away the Congo Crisis, which is simply discussed through 
the lens of how it influenced Kennedy’s relationships with other African leaders. 
This is problematic because Muehlenbeck goes to great lengths to differentiate 
Kennedy’s policies from other Cold War-era leaders, yet actions in the Congo or 
(in)action in South Africa are not simply aberrations as Muehlenbeck asserts on 
page xvi, they are indicative of an approach to diplomacy that was deeply personal 
in some cases, but also very telling in the continuation of pro-Western policies that 
sought to maintain stability and control in the midst of the Cold War.
While the bulk of Muehlenbeck’s limited discussion of the Congo Crisis 
centers on Lumumba and his death in 1961, it seems as if there is a careful forgetting 
of the fact that this conflict did not end after the death of Lumumba. There is no 
sustained or meaningful engagement in an effort to make sense of the extreme 
limitations of “personal diplomacy” in the case of the longer process of the Congo 
Crisis. This is troubling because one cannot simply ignore the immense diplomatic 
implications of the Congo Crisis because it was one of the most important conflicts 
in the continent of Africa in the years immediately following independence. 
Designating Kennedy’s stance in the Congo Crisis as an anomaly is problematic 
because it downplays the significance of this horrific event in African history 
within US policy. While Muehlenbeck provides an engaging and multi- faceted 
approach to the various ways in which Kennedy practiced personal diplomacy, it is 
difficult to label this as his dominant method of approaching African politics when 
some of the most influential and troubling parts of US-Africa diplomacy existed 
outside of this realm during the Kennedy presidency.
Nevertheless, Muehlenbeck’s work is very successful in a number of other 
areas. Muehlenbeck’s chapter on the rivalry between Kennedy and De Gaulle 
in Africa is especially noteworthy, as it carefully outlines the shifting nature of 
US-French relations with the (re)construction of spheres of influence during the 
early 1960s. As Muehlenbeck astutely assesses, De Gaulle “[envisioned] himself 
as a protective shield from superpower hegemony and Kennedy [saw] himself as 
a protective shield from French neocolonialism” (163). Thus, in continuation of 
this theme, Muehlenbeck outlines subtle and not-so-subtle attempts to extend, 
consolidate, or challenge influences in Africa from both the US and France. 
While Muehlenbeck’s brief introduction to Francophone Africa’s affinity with 
De Gaulle was a bit superficial, the chapter was very successful at capturing the 
nuanced rivalry between the two leaders by carefully demarcating strategic spaces 
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in Africa, analyzing motivations, exploring personalities, and assessing policies. 
Additionally, Muehlenbeck’s discussion of US- France tensions that influenced 
Peace Corps volunteers on the ground in Francophone Africa emphasized ways in 
which international politics intersected with daily life in a very tangible manner.
Muehlenbeck’s chapter on Kennedy’s relationship with Sékou Touré was 
intriguing because it emphasized the complex transformation of US-Guinea 
relationships, as evidenced by the fact that Eisenhower previously dismissed the 
Guinean leader as a communist (58). Thus, gaining a relationship with Guinea 
was a bit more complex than using Kennedy’s charm to secure the allegiance of 
a nation that was already friendly with the US. Yet, through the engaging and 
well-researched chapter, Muehlenbeck presents the argument that Kennedy “was 
able to not only influence Guinea back to a position of neutrality but by the end of 
Kennedy’s life the Guinean leader had even become slightly pro-Western” (58). In 
order to demonstrate this argument, Muehlenbeck chronicles debates over US aid 
to Guinea, both from US and Guinean perspectives, Touré’s visit to Washington 
in 1962, and the US Civil Rights related, and fabricated, controversy at the OAU 
conference in Addis Ababa in 1963. By examining these episodes, Muehlenbeck 
argues for the transformation of US-Guinea relations, which would ultimately 
facilitate “Guinea’s support of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis, 
the Congo crisis, and the outbreak of racial violence in the American south, and 
they could judge Sékou Touré not only by what he did-but also what he said” (72). 
This chapter is important because it is the first of five case studies of Kennedy’s 
personal diplomacy with some African nations. Yet, as the chapter on Kennedy 
and Touré reveals, Kennedy’s relationships with these leaders varied greatly and 
provided a range of political opportunities for all actors.
Overall, Muehlenbeck’s Betting on the Africans is an intriguing and 
important work that emphasizes the significance of personal diplomacy during 
Kennedy’s presidency. While there are obvious issues with Muehlenbeck’s limited 
discussions of the aforementioned aberrations, the book is largely successful in 
its efforts to shift towards a different type of Cold War politics, namely, one that 
focused on Kennedy’s personal diplomacy. While there are many books on Africa 
and the Cold War, I am confident that this monograph will be an important source 
of information for scholars and students interested in international diplomacy, 
Africa, and the Cold War.
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